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Testing Times Ahead? 
Roger Brownsword* and Jeff Wale** 
 
Introduction 
About twenty years ago, it was discovered that placental cell free DNA can be detected in the 
blood of pregnant women. Following this discovery, it is now possible to use a simple blood 
test―so-called ‘non-invasive prenatal testing’ (NIPT)―to ascertain, at a relatively early stage 
of a pregnancy, genetic information about both the woman and the fetus. On the face of it, 
NIPT represents a significant addition to the reproductive options that are available to women 
(and their partners).1 However, the question raised by the development of NIPT is not whether 
it is legitimate for women to make their own (informed) reproductive choices, but whether (or 
which of) the choices now facilitated by NIPT are ‘legitimate’ ones for women to have.2 
In this article, our first, and principal, purpose is to review the Nuffield Council on Bioethics’ 
(NCOB’s) report on Non-Invasive Prenatal Testing: Ethical Issues (the Report)3, a report that 
takes a relatively conservative position in relation to the permissible uses of NIPT. Secondly, 
we introduce two more general questions provoked by the Report, one concerning the nature 
and extent of the informational interests that are to be recognised in today’s ‘information 
societies’ and the other concerning the membership of today’s ‘genetic societies’. Thirdly, at a 
time when the NCOB is undergoing a process of ‘renewal’, we ask what kind of bioethics body 
the Council is and aspires to be.  
Our central criticism of the Report is that, while it lays out very clearly a range of competing 
individual and collective interests that might bear on one’s view as to which uses of NIPT are 
legitimate, it misses the opportunity to put these interests into an order of importance that would 
                                                          
*  King’s College London and Bournemouth University; affiliate of the Nuffield Council on Bioethics and 
one of the referees for the report on Non-Invasive Prenatal Testing: Ethical Issues; and member of the 
UK National Screening Committee. The views expressed in this paper are purely personal and should 
not be taken to represent or reflect the views of either the Council or the Committee.  
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 We are grateful for the many helpful comments made by the referees. Needless to say, the usual 
disclaimers apply. 
 
1  For the sake of economy, we will not keep repeating ‘and their partners’, but it should be taken to be 
implicit. 
 
2  The initial choice is whether or not to have the test, then whether or not to be informed as to the results, 
and then which of the post-result options (including further tests and deciding whether or not to terminate 
the pregnancy) to take. 
 
3  Nuffield Council on Bioethics, Non-invasive prenatal testing: ethical issues (London, March 2017); and, 
for a helpful background paper, see Vardit Ravitsky, ‘Non-Invasive Prenatal Testing (NIPT): Identifying 
Key Clinical, Ethical, Social, Legal and Policy Issues’: available at http://nuffieldbioethics.org/wp-
content/uploads/NIPT-background-paper-8-Nov-2015-FINAL.pdf (last accessed April 27, 2016). 
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explain and justify why the Council takes the particular view that it does. In the light of this 
criticism, we suggest that the Council should develop such an order of importance (and we 
sketch how this might be done); or, failing that, we argue that the Council should present its 
reflections in a way that engages public debate around a number of options rather than making 
firm recommendations.   
We start by sketching the context in which the NCOB has undertaken its work on NIPT. Then, 
we turn to the Report, focusing on its ethical framework, its recommendations, and its effective 
implementation. This leads to the two more general questions prompted by the Report. Finally, 
we consider the methodology and role of the NCOB. We suggest that at every level―for 
pregnant women, for communities, for the NCOB, and for regulators―there are challenging 
times ahead. 
The Context for the Report 
Early in 2016, following a successful trial led by Professor Lyn Chitty at Great Ormond Street 
Hospital,4 the UK National Screening Committee announced that it would recommend the 
cautious piloting of NIPT within the existing screening programme for Down syndrome.5 
Stated simply, pregnant women will be initially screened using the so-called combined test6; 
then, those who are identified as being significantly at risk will be offered NIPT. While women 
who have a negative NIPT result can avoid the more invasive tests for Down syndrome 
(namely, amniocentesis or chorionic villus sampling), those women with a positive NIPT result 
will be advised to have one of these tests. If NIPT lives up to its promise, reducing the number 
of more invasive tests and, concomitantly, the number of babies lost during pregnancy, its 
advocates will wonder what there is not to like about this new option. 
Nevertheless, some will oppose NIPT because they see it as exacerbating existing concerns 
about the ‘medicalisation’ of pregnancy, the ‘commodification’ of life, the ‘trivialisation’ of 
decisions about abortion, the ‘routinisation’ of prenatal testing, and the ‘stigmatisation of 
disability’, and so on.7 In addition to such concerns, however, there is a new anxiety that stems 
from the potential use of NIPT to provide information about the fetus that goes beyond Down 
syndrome and the other trisomies,8 even to the point of full genomic profiling, as well as 
                                                          
4  http://www.rapid.nhs.uk/about-rapid/evaluation-study-nipt-for-down-syndrome/. 
 
5  See J. Gallagher, ‘Safer Down’s test backed for NHS use’ (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-
35311578). 
6  This test combines information from a serum screen with a measurement from an ultrasound scan of the 
nuchal fold on the back of the neck of the fetus. 
 
7  See (2015) 29:1 Bioethics (special issue on NIPT).  
 
8  For example, Sequenom’s MaterniT 21 PLUS ‘can tell you if you are having a boy or a girl, and screens 
for both common and rare chromosomal abnormalities. The test screens for trisomy 21 (Down 
syndrome), trisomy 18 (Edwards syndrome), trisomy 13 (Patau syndrome), and many others that can 
affect your baby’s health’: see https://sequenom.com/tests/reproductive-health/maternit21-plus#patient-
overview (last accessed April 5, 2017). 
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returning information about the mother.9 There are also some questions about the accuracy, 
reliability, and interpretability of the test. While NIPT is extremely reliable in relation to Down 
syndrome, it is a bit less reliable in relation to Edwards’ and Patau’s syndromes;10 and, in the 
case of some chromosomal microdeletions (missing genetic information) and 
microduplications (additional duplicated genetic information), the results may be equivocal 
and hard to interpret.  
If NIPT were to be available only within the NHS, regulators might be reasonably confident 
that they could control its availability and application. However, private sector providers of the 
test already offer a range of information which, in our connected on-line environments, is only 
an email away. Accordingly, in practice, there are reasons to doubt the ability of national 
regulators to confine private providers to the particular terms and conditions for use of NIPT 
that they (the regulators) might specify.11 National regulators might find that they are whistling 
in the wind. 
It was in this context that the Nuffield Council on Bioethics set up a Working Group (chaired 
by Professor Tom Shakespeare) ‘to consider the ethical, legal and regulatory implications of 
recent and potential future scientific developments in NIPT, with regard to its use in both NHS 
and commercial services, including for whole genome/exome sequencing’.12 Although the 
Working Group did not treat their remit as an invitation to review the current law on abortion, 
the relatively permissive legal framework for terminations is central to the context in which 
NIPT is being discussed. To be sure, some of the points for discussion concern the way in 
which the information yielded by NIPT might impact on women and future children; but the 
core of the debate is about how such information might impact on the pattern of terminations. 
Indeed, if the law were less permissive, there might be less agitation about NIPT and less 
pressure to stake out a restrictive position.  
That said, even if we believe that the full range of the law relating to reproduction needs to be 
up for discussion, the Report is likely to be a point of reference in both the bioethical literature 
and in public debates about NIPT.13 
                                                          
9  See, e.g., K. Oswald, ‘Prenatal blood test detects cancer in mothers-to-be’, Bionews 739 (2015) at 
http://www.bionews.org.uk/page_503998.asp. (last accessed September 25, 2016).  
 
10  Report (n 3), para 1.18 et seq. 
 
11  Compare, e.g., the experience of the HFEA: see, Shaoni Bhattacharya, ‘HFEA to investigate claims of 
poor practice in UK fertility sector’ BioNews 899 (2017) at 
http://www.bionews.org.uk/page.asp?obj_id=839506&CView=188645#ULBM-839551 (last accessed 
February 24, 2018). 
 
12  Report (n 3), Terms of reference, p. x. 
 
13  See, e.g., the motion put forward for debate by the Bishop of Carlisle at the Annual Meeting of the 
General Synod of the Church of England on February 10, 2018: available at 
https://www.churchofengland.org/sites/default/files/2018-01/GS%202078%20-
%20Agenda%20%28February%202018%29.pdf (last accessed February 10, 2018). 
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The Report 
In this part of the article, we will focus on: (i) the values that the Council presents as its ethical 
starting points; (ii) the application of the values to a range of ‘interested’ parties; (iii) three 
guiding principles that the Council specifies as a response to the perceived tensions in the 
ethical values and their application to NIPT; (iv) the Council’s recommendations as to the 
availability and use of NIPT; and, (v) the effective implementation of these recommendations. 
We will then undertake a short stock-taking. 
To avoid any misunderstanding, we should make it clear that, in this part of our discussion, we 
are not challenging the Council’s ethical axioms―we are not arguing that the Council has 
started in the wrong place. Rather, we are trying to clarify its starting points and then to trace 
out how they help us to engage with the central contested question: namely, which uses of 
NIPT―from testing simply to be informed through to testing as a precursor to a 
termination―should be treated as legitimate options? 
(i) The Council’s ethical starting points 
As we will explain later in the article, the Council does not subscribe to a particular bioethical 
view. For each report, an operative ethical framework is declared. However, this is not a case 
of the Council taking, say, a utilitarian approach in one report and then a Kantian or a 
communitarian approach in another. The Council simply does not relate to professional 
bioethics in this way. Rather, the ethical framework for each Report is a product of the views 
expressed by consultees together with the views formed by the particular Working Party. 
Accordingly, in the Report, which was preceded by extensive consultation, we read that the 
Council’s ‘ethical starting points’ are given by ‘the values of choice, autonomy and consent; 
avoidance of harm; and equality, inclusion and fairness.’14 We might hear echoes in this of 
Beauchamp and Childress’ principlism15 but no more than that: the ethics in this Report are 
bottom-up and bespoke. 
Choice, autonomy and consent 
It is not entirely clear how the Council understands each of ‘choice’, ‘autonomy’, and ‘consent’ 
or the relationship between them. However, following the landmark decision of the UK 
Supreme Court in Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board,16 few will dispute that, in 
reproductive settings, it is right to take seriously the autonomy of pregnant women, their 
choices, and their consent.17 In fact, after Montgomery, it is easy to argue that, in reproductive 
                                                          
14  Report (n 3), para 1.55. 
 
15  Tom L. Beauchamp and James F. Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics (7th ed) (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2013). 
 
16  [2015] UKSC 11. See, e.g., R. Heywood, ‘R.I.P. Sidaway: Patient-Orientated Disclosure—A Standard 
Worth Waiting For?’ (2015) 23 Medical Law Review 455; and Roger Brownsword and Jeff Wale, ‘The 
Right to Know and the Right Not to Know Revisited’ (2017) 9 Asian Bioethics Review 3. 
 
17  Although, if we take ‘a public health perspective’, matters might be much less straightforward: see Vardit 
Ravitsky, ‘The Shifting Landscape of Prenatal Testing: Between Reproductive Autonomy and Public 
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contexts, women should be aware of the clinical options that are available to them and be free 
to make their own choices. On the face of it, these considerations push in favour of making 
NIPT available to pregnant women. However, there is still much to clarify about autonomy, 
choice, and consent.18  
First, if a woman’s choice is to be treated as autonomous, it really must be her own choice. 
Although the idea of one person, A, making her own choice is incompatible with another 
person, B, making the choice for A (unless, of course, A’s choice is to authorise B so to act), 
or with B coercing A to make a particular choice, the web of relationships in which A finds 
herself might make it difficult to determine whether B, or other persons, are influencing A’s 
decision in a way that compromises it being her own choice. Such hard cases notwithstanding, 
the Council might want to argue that autonomous choice is valuable in and of itself, that there 
are clear cases where women are not making their own choices, and that it is right to do what 
we can to protect and restore autonomy (both on paper and in practice).19 
Secondly, if the necessary and sufficient conditions for A making an autonomous choice (in 
relation to some act) are that A chooses on a free and informed basis, then choices can be 
autonomous without having to be prudent, rational, reasonable, or moral.20 However, if we 
want to regulate the choices that are available to women―which the Council clearly 
does―then the focus of debate about NIPT is not so much on the autonomy of women but on 
the range of reproductive options that we judge to be permissible. It is the value of choice, or 
of particular choices, rather than the value of autonomy that is the ‘hot spot’ in this debate. 
Thirdly, if we have a background bioethical theory, what we make of consent―like what we 
make of autonomy and legitimate choices―will be shaped by that theory.21 Given, however, 
                                                          
Health’ (2017) 47 Hastings Center Report (Issue Supplement S3) S34-S40. According to Ravitsky, the 
debate about NIPT has been dominated by a reproductive autonomy rationale; but, there is also a largely 
unspoken public health rationale which is guided by the societal consequences of reproductive choices 
and the overall impact of individual decisions on the health of future populations. 
 
18  See, e.g., Roger Brownsword. ‘Autonomy, Delegation, and Responsibility: Agents in Autonomic 
Computing Environments’ in Mireille Hildebrandt and Antoinette Rouvroy (eds), Autonomic Computing 
and Transformations of Human Agency (London: Routledge, 2011) 64 (for three conceptions of 
autonomy with different implications for the relevance of choice); and John Coggon and José Miola, 
‘Autonomy, Liberty, and Medical Decision-Making’ (2011) CLJ 523 (particularly for the distinction 
between autonomy qua self-governance or making one’s own choices and liberty qua freedom to act 
without third-party interference or having a ‘real’ option).  
 
19  Compare Emily Jackson and Shelley Day-Sclater, ‘Introduction: Autonomy and Private Life’ in Shelley 
Day-Sclater, Fatemeh Ebtehaj, Emily Jackson, and Martin Richards (eds), Regulating Autonomy: Sex, 
Reproduction and Family (Oxford: Hart, 2009) 1 at 2: ‘protecting autonomy may not only involve simply 
an absence of state interference, but could require the positive provision of resources to enable someone 
to have a meaningful set of options.’ 
  
20  We might recall Lord Donaldson’s famous remarks in Re T [1992] 4 All ER 649, at 652-653 (to the effect 
that adult patients, with capacity, have the absolute right to choose, meaning that this right is not limited 
to making choices that others would regard as sensible or rational). 
 
21  For the way in which apparently ‘neutral’ terms such as ‘consent’ are coloured by the particular bioethical 
background theory that operates them, see Roger Brownsword, Rights, Regulation and the Technological 
Revolution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). 
6 
 
that the Council does not subscribe to any particular school of bioethics, this is just the kind of 
theory that it does not have. Nevertheless, following Montgomery, we can take it that, in clinical 
settings, a consent will not be adequate unless it satisfies conditions relating to freedom, 
information, capacity, and signalling.22 If we then transpose these conditions to our 
understanding of autonomous choice, we will agree with the Council that autonomous choices 
are predicated on having relevant information (which, in the case of NIPT, means having access 
to ‘accurate, balanced and non-directive information’23 about the test) as well as being free 
from improper pressure, duress, and the like.24  
Summing up, the triplet of choice/autonomy/consent is perhaps best read as supporting the 
interest of pregnant women in receiving appropriate information about NIPT, as well as the 
condition for which it is proposed that the test should be used, and then being left to make their 
own choice about whether or not to have the test. However, this is all subject to the proviso 
that the options involving the use of NIPT are legitimate. For the Council, autonomous choice 
might be valued but that is not to say that all choices are valued. 
Avoidance of harm 
While it is axiomatic that clinicians should ‘do no harm’,25 the import of the Council’s second 
starting point is far from self-evident. As the Council itself emphasised in one of its earlier and 
most reflective reports, 
the concepts of ‘benefit’, ‘harm’, ‘better’, ‘poorer’, etc are ambiguous and the nature 
and likelihoods of different outcomes arising from biotechnologies uncertain, and 
frequently contested.26 
Even if we set aside the notorious vagueness in the concept of harm,27 it is important to know 
relative to whom or relative to what the harm in question is to be avoided. 
                                                          
  
22  See, Deryck Beyleveld and Roger Brownsword, Consent in the Law (Oxford: Hart, 2007). 
 
23  Report (n 3), para 1.59. 
 
24  Report (n 3), para 1.62. Coggon and Miola (n 18), referring to Al Hamwi v Johnston and Another [2005] 
EWHC 206, make the important point that the chooser also needs to have an adequate understanding of 
the information. 
 
25  See, e.g., Sheila McLean (ed), First, Do No Harm (Festschrift for Ken Mason) (Aldershot: Ashgate, 
2006). 
 
26  Nuffield Council on Bioethics, Emerging biotechnologies: technology, choice and the public good 
(London, 2012), para 10.4(d). 
 
27  Compare, e.g., Roger Brownsword, ‘Cloning, Zoning, and the Harm Principle’, in Sheila McLean (ed) 
(n 25) 527, and ‘A Simple Regulatory Principle for Performance-Enhancing Technologies: Too Good to 
be True?’, in Jan Tolleneer, Pieter Bonte, and Sigird Sterckx (eds) Athletic Enhancement, Human Nature 
and Ethics: Threats and Opportunities of Doping Technologies (Heidelberg: Springer, 2012) 291. 
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The Council indicates that the avoidance of harm might mean ‘restricting access to NIPT in 
order to protect women from coming to harm’.28 However, it also contemplates that the harm 
to be avoided might relate to ‘others’ and that this ‘may mean limiting the freedom to access 
NIPT in some circumstances in order to protect the fetus, or to prevent harm to wider society.’29  
If we link this back to the idea that it is right to leave women to make their own reproductive 
choices, provided that these are legitimate choices; and if we take it that choices that occasion 
harm to the woman making the choice, or to a fetus or to wider society are not legitimate; then 
we might wonder just how many options (on paper, let alone in practice30) will be left for 
women autonomously to choose. 
To the extent that the ‘avoidance of harm’ is designed to ensure that women make their own 
reproductive choices, there is no restriction on the choices that are available. However, if the 
‘avoidance of harm’ is designed to ensure that women (with capacity) avoid making choices 
that others judge to be contrary to their best interests, or that might be harmful to unborn or 
future human life, or that might be harmful to society, this invites a host of objections (including 
objections to paternalistic and illiberal restriction on the choices available)31 and difficult 
questions (concerning, for example, the moral status of the fetus,32 the status of future 
generations, the causal link between individual choices and harmful impacts on wider society, 
and where the burden of justification lies).33  
To pause over just one objection, the avoidance of ‘harm to wider society’ could relate to many 
different kinds and degrees of harm to human interests. While it is one thing to restrict 
reproductive autonomy and choice in order to prevent catastrophic harm to the conditions for 
human existence, it is quite another to restrict it because this is the majority’s preference in a 
particular community. In due course, we will follow this up by suggesting that, unless some 
hierarchy is developed within the Council’s ethical starting points, the question of which 
reproductive options are legitimate will be left to a ‘balancing’ exercise that is more intuitive 
and pragmatic than principled.34   
                                                          
28  Report (n 3), para 1.67. 
 
29  Report (n 3), para 1.67. 
 
30  See Roger Brownsword, ‘Law, Liberty and Technology’ in Roger Brownsword, Eloise Scotford, and 
Karen Yeung (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Law, Regulation and Technology (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2017) 41. 
 
31  See, e.g., Stephen Wilkinson, Choosing Tomorrow’s Children (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2010) at 11 (on 
the standard Millian limiting principle).  
 
32  A question to which, of course, there are several possible answers. See para 5.2 of the Report (n 3). 
 
33  On this last point, compare John A. Robertson, Children of Choice: Freedom and the New Reproductive 
Technologies (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994) (presumption in favour of procreative 
liberty, with the burden on opponents to demonstrate the harmful effects of some particular reproductive 
technique). 
 
34  See, further, our discussion at pp xxx below. 
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Equality, fairness and inclusion 
Equality, like autonomy, can be conceived of in more than one way35 and, indeed, what one 
makes of the compatibility of equality with autonomy and choice depends very much on how 
one understands these concepts. Potentially, the Council’s third ethical starting point, like its 
second, bears in a restrictive way on the range of reproductive options that should be left 
available for the autonomous choice of women. 
In its introductory remarks, the Council says that equality starts with the idea that the State 
should respect ‘the equal value of all people’ and this is backed by the aspiration to cultivate 
‘a fair and inclusive society.’36 According to the Report, while the equality agenda has been 
taken forward in relation to gender (and reproductive choice) and the status of disabled people, 
it remains a cause for concern that ‘disabled people in the UK do not currently have access to 
the same opportunities as those without disabilities and continue to be discriminated against, 
excluded and marginalised.’37 The implication is that whatever equality (and other) arguments 
there might be in support of making NIPT available in the public health service, the State 
should do nothing to add to the existing failure to treat disabled people in a fair and fully 
inclusive way.38  
Pulling these threads together, these starting points suggest that, while it is right to let women 
make their own legitimate reproductive choices, such choices should not include the use of 
NIPT where this would be harmful to women, to the fetus or a future child, or to wider society, 
particularly by compromising the ideals of equality, fairness and inclusivity.   
(ii) The impact of NIPT on ‘interested’ parties 
As the Council rightly says, what we make of NIPT rather depends upon whose perspective we 
take—that of ‘pregnant women and couples, future people that fetuses might become, disabled 
people, [or] wider society.’39 For some, the impact of NIPT will be positive, but for others it 
will be negative. 
The most obvious beneficiaries of NIPT are pregnant women and couples, whose reproductive 
choices (and equality) promise to be enhanced. However, this is subject to the general proviso 
that the context supports the making of a free and informed choice (coupled with the choosing 
                                                          
35  See, e.g., John McMillan and Jeanne Snelling, ‘Equality: Old Debates, New Technologies’ in 
Brownsword et al (n 30) 69. 
 
36  Report (n 3), paras 1.71-1.73. Even, it seems, to the point of including those who are merely potential 
future persons. 
 
37  Report (n 3), para 1.77. 
 
38  Compare Erik Parens and Adrienne Asch, ‘The Disability Rights Critique of Prenatal Genetic Testing 
―Reflections and Recommendations’ (1999) 29 Hastings Center Report S1-S24; and Tom Shakespeare, 
Disability Rights and Wrongs (Abingdon: Routledge, 2006). 
 
39  Report (n 3), para 5.3. 
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agent being able freely to act on their choice)―otherwise there might be more choice but not 
enhanced autonomous choice. It is important, for example, that the information given to 
pregnant women about NIPT is accurate and reliable (including whether or not the information 
yielded by the test itself is accurate and reliable); and the Council suggests, too, that 
reproductive autonomy might be compromised if the information given about the impact of 
genetic variations on disabled people and their families, as well as information about medical 
or societal attitudes towards disability, is inaccurate or unreliable.  
By contrast, while pregnant women might be harmed by NIPT―at any rate, if the context for 
free and informed choice is defective in some way, or if the test fails or proves to be inaccurate, 
unreliable, or inconclusive40―the more obvious harm is to both the (terminated) fetus (unless 
one subscribes to the view that, at the relevant time, the fetus has no moral standing) and the 
(non-terminated) fetus-that-becomes-a-person (to some extent consequent on the loss of an 
‘open future’41 and infringement of the right not to know but also arising from infringements 
of that person’s privacy). While disabled persons are not immediately and directly harmed by 
NIPT, they might suffer incremental and indirect harms, such as psychological harm arising 
from what they perceive as a negative valuation of them, less research into the genetic 
conditions that underlie the disabilities, and fewer services for (as well as discrimination 
against) a now reduced population of disabled persons. Furthermore, if the popular perception 
of disability changes in a way that leads to people being blamed for having a baby with a 
disability, then this ‘might make disabled people and their families more vulnerable to 
discrimination, stigma or abuse.’42 
Finally—although the Council does not express it in quite these terms—there are perspectives 
that reflect one’s view of the kind of society to which one wants to belong.43 For example, one 
might think that it is unfair to expend scarce public health care resources in order to inform 
pregnant women about non-serious conditions or non-medical traits; or one might object to a 
change in what is considered to be a healthy pregnancy or a healthy child that is less inclusive; 
and, for similar reasons, one might oppose any movement towards eugenics.44 Beyond such 
matters, the Council also notes a concern about NIPT being used to facilitate the birth of 
                                                          
40  Report (n 3), para 5.10. 
 
41  Report (n 3), para 5.6. Seminally, see Joel Feinberg, ‘The Child’s Right to an Open Future’ in Joel 
Feinberg (ed), Freedom and Fulfillment: Philosophical Essays (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1992) 76. See, too, Wilkinson (n 31), at 47 (cautioning that talk of a child’s right to an open future ‘is 
not terribly helpful, both in general and a fortiori when discussing selective reproduction scenarios in 
which the putative rights bearers do not even exist yet’) and at 47-54 (for the way in which various 
concerns about the autonomy of a future child might be implicated in such talk).  
 
42  Report (n 3), para 5.18. Compare Martin B. Delatycki, ‘The Ethics of Screening for Disease’ (2012) 
44(2) Pathology 63, at 65, where the author notes that ‘when a child is born with trisomy 21, parents 
have reported being questioned about why the diagnosis was not made during the pregnancy and steps 
take to prevent the birth of that child.’   
 
43  See Parens and Asch (n 38). 
 
44  Compare the cautionary remarks in Ravitsky (n 17); and, see Wilkinson (n 31) Ch 6. 
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designer babies, such concern possibly reflecting a positive view of inclusion, but which might 
also be inspired by the kind of conservative dignitarian ethics that has been so opposed to the 
commodification or the commercialisation of life.45    
Given this plurality of perspectives, the key challenge for the Council is to articulate a concept 
of legitimate reproductive choice in a way that accommodates the interests of  pregnant women 
and couples, the interests of the fetus-that-becomes-a-person, the interests of disabled persons, 
and the interests of wider society with its collective aspirations for equality, fairness and 
inclusion. 
(iii) Three guiding principles 
The Council suggests that policy-making should be guided by the following three principles46: 
Principle 1 (P1): The wider societal environment in which NIPT is provided and 
developed should be considered when developing policy relating to NIPT. 
 
Principle 2 (P2): Pregnant women and couples should have access, where 
appropriate, to NIPT within an environment that enables them to make autonomous, 
informed choices. 
 
Principle 3 (P3): Efforts should be made to reduce any risks of significant harms 
posed by growing use and development of NIPT. 
While P2 is designed to promote an environment for the exercise of free and informed 
reproductive choices—including ensuring that ‘accurate, balanced and non-directive 
information is made available to women and couples in both the private and public sectors’47—
P1 and P3 are intended to set limits on such choices. In P1, the ‘wider societal environment’ 
stands for the community’s aspiration that its members should be treated equally, fairly, and in 
an inclusive manner—an aspiration that, in part, militates against the use of NIPT ‘for less 
significant medical conditions and impairments, non-medical traits, and whole genome and 
exome sequencing;48 and, in P3, the ‘risks of significant harms’ relate to ‘the autonomy, 
privacy, rights and other interests of future children and people, who should be able to make 
their own choices regarding information about their genetic makeup, to access the same 
opportunities and services as those who know nothing about their genetic makeup, and to live 
a life in which their future is open.’49  
                                                          
45  See, e.g., Roger Brownsword, ‘Bioethics Today, Bioethics Tomorrow: Stem Cell Research and the 
“Dignitarian Alliance”’ (2003) 17 University of Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics and Public Policy 
15. 
 
46  Report (n 3), paras 5.24-5.37. 
 
47  Report (n 3), para 5.31. 
 
48  Report (n 3), para 5.28. 
 
49  Report (n 3), para 5.37. 
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Applying these principles, a compromise is brokered. On the one hand, autonomy and choice 
is privileged over inclusivity: for, even with some tilting of the informational environment in 
which choices about NIPT are being made, a woman might still decide to have NIPT and to 
act on its results by terminating her pregnancy. On the other hand, the avoidance of harm and 
the promotion of inclusivity are privileged over autonomy and choice: NIPT should not be used 
to test for conditions that are not significant (whether minor medical conditions or non-medical 
traits) or where there is a risk of significant harm to a future person.  
However, the fundamental question remains: the compromise recognises only some choices as 
legitimate but in what sense is this really principled? 
(iv) The Council’s recommendations 
Broadly speaking, the Council’s overarching conclusions are as we might expect.50 They focus 
on three things: first, supporting the conditions that constitute the context for pregnant women 
to make autonomous reproductive choices with regard to the use of NIPT; secondly, supporting 
a social environment where disabled persons are valued as equals, and treated fairly and 
inclusively; and, thirdly, limiting access to and use of NIPT where the informational interests 
of pregnant women are relatively insignificant and are outweighed by the interests of future 
persons.  
Although it is recommended that the UK National Screening Committee should take ‘better 
consideration of the particular psychological, ethical and social consequences, some of which 
will be unintended, of any prenatal screening programme where termination of pregnancy is 
an option’,51 the Council supports the piloting of NIPT within the national screening 
programme for Down syndrome. There is also a clutch of recommendations concerning NIPT 
in the private sector, including that the ‘Committee of Advertising Practice should more closely 
monitor the marketing activities of NIPT manufacturers and private hospitals and clinics to 
ensure that they are not misleading or harmful’; that NIPT providers should seek certification 
from recognised information quality schemes; and that private hospitals and clinics ‘should 
only offer NIPT as part of an inclusive package of care that should include, at a minimum, pre- 
and post-test counselling and follow-up invasive diagnostic testing if required.’52 
The Council, however, recommends two limits on the use of NIPT that invite further 
discussion: first, that NIPT should be offered only if it provides an accurate prediction of 
whether the fetus has or does not have the condition being tested for; and, second, that NIPT 
should ‘not normally’ be used to check ‘whether a fetus has a less significant medical condition 
or impairment or an adult onset condition; to find out whether the fetus is the carrier of a gene 
                                                          
 
50  Report (n 3), p. 126. 
 
51  Report (n 3), para 6.33. 
 
52  Report (n 3), p. 126. 
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for any kind of medical condition or impairment; [or] to reveal non-medical traits of the fetus, 
including sex.’53  
Accuracy 
The first limiting recommendation discourages the return of findings that are difficult to 
interpret or that cannot be acted on with any confidence. While the Council is not alone in 
thinking that such findings should not be returned, it is not clear how this view sits with the 
value of reproductive autonomy or a pregnant woman’s right to know. In support of a restriction 
relating to the return of such findings, the following three justifications might be offered. 
First, it might be said that findings that are not reliable, accurate, interpretable and actionable 
are not worth having. To strike such findings from the list of NIPT options makes no difference 
to a pregnant woman’s autonomy and the choices that are not available are not worth having. 
This, however, ignores the wishes of women who want to know simply for the sake of 
knowing54 or who want to bank the results pending a time when they are more interpretable 
and actionable (albeit not during their current pregnancy). 
Secondly, the argument might be that women might be harmed by irresponsible providers who 
are willing, without giving fair warning, to return inaccurate or non-interpretable, or non-
actionable results, possibly leading to some psychological anxiety and economic loss. Such a 
consumer protection justification for the restriction might be supplemented by concerns about 
possible consequential costs to publicly-funded health care. 
Thirdly, the second argument might be extended to focus on possible harm to the fetus that 
becomes a future person. However, those who argue for a robust right to know might wonder 
why a (current) woman’s informational interests should have to yield for the sake of the 
informational interests of (i) a fetus that might or might not become a future person and (ii) 
when the results of the test might or might not be ones that, in future, can be relied on.   
Although there is some intuitive appeal in the proposition that inaccurate findings should not 
be returned, the question is whether the option to use NIPT knowing that the results might not 
be accurate and reliable is a legitimate one. Saying that the results will not be useful is hardly 
compelling; saying that the results might be harmful to the woman is paternalistic; and saying 
that the results might harm a fetus that might or might not become a future person invites further 
analysis and debate. 
The type of condition 
There is much that might be said in relation to the second limiting recommendation but we will 
make just four points. 
                                                          
53  Ibid. The Council also concludes that NIPT should not normally be used for whole genome or exome 
sequencing of fetuses except in a research environment. 
 
54  See, Z. Deans, A.J. Clarke, and A.J. Newson, ‘For your interest? The ethical acceptability of using non-
invasive prenatal testing to test “purely for information”’ (2014) 29 Bioethics 19. 
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First, the recommendation presupposes that the results obtained by NIPT are likely to be used 
to inform a woman’s choice about the continuation or termination of her pregnancy. While this 
is not an unreasonable assumption, it presents a danger of losing sight of the question of 
whether it is legitimate to know simply for its own sake or for the sake of forward planning 
(but not termination).55 For example, in those communities where there is pre-conception 
genetic testing  of teenage children (to inform the latter about their carrier status),56 a pregnant 
woman’s use of NIPT to check for carrier status in her child might be viewed as a perfectly 
legitimate option. Similarly, although late onset conditions can present hard cases for any 
bioethicist,57 it is one thing to want to be aware that a future person has the markers for such a 
condition and quite another to want to know (as was the case with the claimant in ABC v St 
George's Healthcare NHS Trust & Ors58) as a precursor to a possible termination.    
Secondly, there is a sense that the proposed restrictions are made in the shadow of the existing 
law on abortion. Not only does this shadow obscure the question of whether a woman may 
legitimately want to know simply for its own sake, but also the Report brackets off the 
legitimacy of the law (and whatever shadow it casts). So, for example, when it is recommended 
that NIPT providers should be prohibited from generating or reporting information about the 
sex of the fetus unless ‘there is concern that the fetus may be showing signs of a significant sex 
chromosome aneuploidy or is at risk of a sex-linked disorder’59, NIPT is being viewed as a 
precursor to a termination (rather than information pure and simple about the sex of the child) 
and questions about what the law on social sex selection actually is and what it ought to be are 
off the table.60    
                                                          
55  See Deans et al (n 54). 
 
56  See Human Genetics Commission, Increasing options, informing choice: A report on preconception 
genetic testing and screening (London, April 2011). 
 
57  Compare Deryck Beyleveld, Oliver Quarrell and Stuart Toddington, ‘Generic Consistency in the 
Reproductive Enterprise: Ethical and Legal Implications of Exclusion Testing for Huntington’s Disease’ 
(1998) 3 Medical Law International 135. 
 
58  [2015] EWHC 1394 (QB), [2017] EWCA Civ 336. In the ABC case, the claimant, who was pregnant 
at the relevant time, sued the defendants, complaining that they had failed to inform her that her father 
had been diagnosed with Huntington’s Disease. Had the claimant been so informed, she would have 
known that she was at risk of having the disease and, knowing that her child would also be at risk, she 
would have terminated the pregnancy. In the High Court, the claim was struck out on the ground that, 
because the defendants obtained the information about the father’s health status in confidence, and 
because the father was emphatic that he did not want his daughter to be told, it would not be fair, just, 
and reasonable to impose on them a duty to inform the daughter; but, the Court of Appeal reversed this 
decision and remitted the case for trial. 
59  Report (n 3), para 6.16. 
 
60  On what the law is, see Emily Jackson, ‘The legality of abortion for fetal sex’ in Britain’s abortion law. 
What it says, and why (Stratford-upon-Avon: BPAS, May 2013) 19, available at 
http://www.reproductivereview.org/images/uploads/Britains_abortion_law.pdf (last accessed February 
11, 2018). To the extent that doubts about this matter turn on a lack of DoH guidance, compare Emily 
Jackson, ‘Abortion, Autonomy and Prenatal Diagnosis’ (2000) 9 Social and Legal Studies 467, 470-471, 
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Thirdly, the distinction between significant and less significant medical conditions is central to 
the recommendation. No doubt, there will be plenty of questions about how to draw this 
distinction, including whether a significant condition is the same as a ‘serious’ condition or a 
‘severely disabling’ condition. However, there is once again a danger of losing sight of the 
distinction between a woman simply wanting to know and her wanting to know in order to 
decide whether to terminate her pregnancy. Arguably, a woman has a right to use NIPT to 
detect conditions such as CF or, say, hypertrophic cardiomyopathy61 regardless of whether they 
are characterised as significant or less significant medical conditions. Whether or not NIPT 
should be used to test for such conditions as a precursor to a decision about continuing or 
terminating a pregnancy is another matter. 
Fourthly, if we are to make an adequate assessment of the recommendation, we need to be 
critically aware not only of the law on abortion but of the full spectrum of the regulatory 
environment relating to reproductive information and choice. From PGD to NIPT, there needs 
to be a narrative that both explains and justifies who can be tested for what, how and by whom 
the test is to be administered, what information is to be returned, and who pays for all of this.62 
In short, the regulatory environment should be coherent.63 However, this is no easy matter. 
Once we set the proposed restrictions on NIPT in this larger regulatory context, we soon meet 
the more general questions about the kind of community that we want to be that we will 
introduce later in the article.   
(v) Effectiveness 
In a world designed for regulatory effectiveness, regulators would know exactly what they 
planned to achieve, they would commit sufficient resources to all phases of the regulatory 
cycle, there would be no attempt by regulatees to corrupt or capture regulators, there would be 
no resistance by regulatees, and there would be no external interference. Needless to say, this 
is not our world, and it is certainly not the world in which the State might act on the Council’s 
recommendations. 
                                                          
and Jeff Wale, ‘Don't forget the legal framework: the public provision of non-invasive prenatal testing 
in England & Wales’ (2015) 15(4) Medical Law International 203, 211.  
 
61  https://www.bhf.org.uk/heart-health/conditions/cardiomyopathy/hypertrophic-cardiomyopathy (last 
accessed July 15, 2017). This condition is a target for the use of the latest gene-editing techniques: see 
Ian Sample, ‘Deadly gene mutations removed from human embryos in landmark study’ The Guardian 
August 2, 2017 ( available at https://www.theguardian.com/science/2017/aug/02/deadly-gene-
mutations-removed-from-human-embryos-in-landmark-study) (last accessed August 3, 2017). 
 
62  Nb the seminal critique of the regulatory environment for reproduction in Emily Jackson, ‘Conception 
and the Irrelevance of the Welfare Principle’ (2002) 65 MLR 176; and for some important cautions about 
equating PGD with Prenatal Testing, or an embryo with a fetus, see Rosamund Scott, ‘Choosing between 
Possible Lives: Legal and Ethical Issues in Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis’ (2006) 26 OJLS 153. 
 
63  On which, see Roger Brownsword, ‘Regulatory Coherence—A European Challenge’ in Kai Purnhagen 
and Peter Rott (eds), Varieties of European Economic Law and Regulation: Essays in Honour of Hans 
Micklitz (Heidelberg: Springer, 2014) 235.  
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Insofar as it is accepted that NIPT should be offered subject to the Council’s recommended 
terms and conditions, there would seem to be better prospects for effective implementation in 
the public sector than in relation to private sector provision. Even then, we should not assume 
that there will not be resistance to limited availability and use within the NHS. Already, for 
example, the UK National Screening Committee (UKNSC) has experienced significant 
resistance to its unwillingness to introduce routine screening for group B Streptococcus in 
pregnancy and, concomitantly, to make more use of antibiotics.64 If, following its piloting of 
NIPT, the UKNSC adopts a restrictive policy to which there is significant opposition, it might 
find that its experience with the group B Strep community is repeated with a new lobbying 
group for NIPT.  
However, with regard to the private sector provision of NIPT, there are additional factors that 
militate against effective implementation of the Council’s recommendations. Most 
importantly, many private providers will have an online presence. As the Council 
acknowledges, any attempt to restrict access to NIPT in order to determine the sex of a fetus 
might be ineffective ‘given the possibility of accessing NIPT services in other countries or via 
the internet’.65  It seems that, while we might endlessly debate the rights and wrongs of 
particular uses of NIPT, we should lower our expectations about the effective implementation 
of any policy that impinges on the reproductive choices that pregnant women—or, at any rate, 
pregnant women with sufficient resources—might want to have.  
Significantly, there is already evidence—confirmed by the Council’s own review66—that 
online information about NIPT falls short of what is required for the proper exercise of 
reproductive autonomy. For instance, there is evidence that commercial test providers are 
pitching their online communications above the recommended reading age for public health 
information’,67 and that some commercial web advertising may contain inadequate or outdated 
information68 (the latter being a particular risk when technology advances so quickly). Whilst 
the threat of deliberate miss-selling or fraud might be unlikely, it is no surprise that commercial 
test providers tend to emphasise the benefits rather than the limitations of the technology in 
                                                          
64  See, in particular, the lobbying activities of the Group B Strep Support campaign 
(http://gbss.org.uk/campaigning/parliament/contact-your-mp/) and its response to the latest consultation 
on the matter by the UK National Screening Committee (http://gbss.org.uk/latest-news/say-group-b-
strep-uk-national-screening-review/) (both sites last accessed July 13, 2017). 
 
65  Report (n 3), para 4.48. 
 
66  See Report (n 3) at para 4.22 (for the Council’s own review of the adequacy of ‘information made 
available on the websites and in patient leaflets of manufacturers, hospitals and clinics’). 
 
67  MB Mercer, PK Agatisa and RM Farrell, ‘What patients are reading about non-invasive prenatal testing: 
an evaluation of Internet content and implications for patient-centered care’ (2014) 34(10) Prenatal 
Diagnosis 986; JW Aarts et al., ‘Patient-focused internet interventions in reproductive medicine: a 
scoping review’ (2012) 18(2) Hum Reprod Update 211, at 212; and Heather Skirton et al., ‘Non-invasive 
prenatal testing for aneuploidy: a systematic review of Internet advertising to potential users by 
commercial companies and private health providers’ (2015) 35(12) Prenatal Diagnosis1167. 
 
68  See Skirton et al (n 67); and Mercer et al (n 67). 
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their marketing material.69 Links to peer reviewed citations are not always present and this can 
make it difficult to evaluate the nature and currency of the claims made.70 Further, private test 
providers do not always mention the specific abnormalities that can reliably be detected 
through conventional trimester screening,71 or the differentials in failure rates between different 
testing technologies.72   
That said, although there are challenges to effective implementation, the position is not 
completely hopeless.73 After all, NIPT cannot be undertaken without blood being drawn and it 
might be possible to exert some domestic control over professional health care workers drawing 
samples for this purpose.74  This apart, if regulators in the UK are to exert some control over 
online provision of NIPT by providers who are based outside the jurisdiction, they need to have 
some leverage over the provider’s assets or personnel or reputation within the UK (recall how, 
in LICRA v Yahoo!,75 the Paris court managed to exert some influence over Yahoo!); or they 
need to persuade internet service providers, or other online intermediaries, to act as 
‘chokepoints’, restricting supply of goods, services, or information from target sites;76 or, there 
might be opportunities for various kinds of reciprocal cross-border enforcement or other forms 
of cooperation between national regulators77—for example, there might be opportunities to 
develop co-operative global state engagement by agreeing guidelines in relation to the leading 
issues.78  
                                                          
69  See Skirton et al (n 67) at 1174; and Mercer et al (n 67). 
 
70  The ARC website suggests that ‘to be of the highest quality, test performance data should be published 
in a peer reviewed scientific journal and should report pregnancy outcomes from studies involving 1000s 
of women.' Available from: http://www.arc-uk.org/tests-explained/non-invasive-prenatal-testing-nipt 
(last accessed February 16, 2017). 
 
71  See Mercer et al (n 67). 
 
72   Yuval Yaron, ‘The implications of non-invasive prenatal testing failures: a review of an under-discussed 
phenomenon’ (2016) 36(5) Prenatal Diagnosis 391. 
 
73  Generally, see Roger Brownsword and Morag Goodwin, Law and the Technologies of the Twenty-First 
Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012) Ch 14; and Mark Leiser and Andrew Murray, 
‘The Role of Non-State Actors in the Governance of New and Emerging Digital Technologies’ in 
Brownsword et al (n 30) 670. 
 
74  Report (n 3), paras 1.43, 6.7, and 6.40. 
 
75   https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/LICRA_v._Yahoo! (last accessed February 26, 2017). 
 
76  Natasha Tusikov, Chokepoints: Global Private Regulation on the Internet (Oakland: University of 
California Press, 2016). 
 
77   See, e.g. Lawrence Lessig, Code Version 2.0 (New York: Basic Books, 2006) Ch 15. 
 
78  See, for e.g., Heather Skirton et al., ‘Offering prenatal diagnostic tests: European guidelines for clinical  
practice guidelines’, (2014) 22(5) Eur J Hum Genet 580: (available at 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/?term=24022298); and the proposed EU IVD Regulation (Report 
(n 3) at para 1.39). 
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Perhaps more controversially, if private provision creates an unacceptable regulatory risk, 
publicly funded NIPT might be mooted. Potentially this would squeeze the private sector (even 
without formal abolition) although the extent of the squeeze would depend on the degree of 
service equivalence. Given that such an initiative would have significant resource 
implications,79 a more realistic solution might be some form of public/private partnership that 
utilises the Council’s proposed system of licensing, certification and professional body 
regulation/guidance.80 The challenge for the State is to determine how far the informational 
interests of pregnant women are to be recognised and supported,81 and then to decide on the 
allocation of costs between the public and private sectors while maintaining a coherent public 
narrative and regulatory environment.82  
(vi) Taking stock 
NIPT is new and it merits the kind of ethical attention that it is given by the Council. 
Nevertheless, seasoned commentators might view the Report as a continuation of old 
debates―for example, debates about the tension between reproductive autonomy and the 
interests of the disabled83, or between individual autonomy and the common good,84 and so on. 
After all, it was some years ago that John Robertson wrote: 
[S]ociety must decide whether to permit these [new reproductive] techniques to be 
developed and used. It must identify the circumstances in which use should be restricted 
or regulated, and devise a framework for respecting individual desires for access while 
maintaining ethical values, protecting offspring and participants, and preventing 
injustice and oppression in their use. This is no small task. The deepest needs of 
individuals must be reconciled with community values in a setting where the rules are 
still unwritten and subject to change.85 
In other words, it might be said that the Report adds little to bioethics, recycling familiar 
arguments and taking a position that represents a relatively conservative compromise between 
principles and interests that are opposed.  
                                                          
79   For discussion of the practical and financial difficulties of a publicly funded testing regime, see C 
Munthe, ‘A New Ethical Landscape of Prenatal Testing: Individualizing Choice to Serve Autonomy and 
Promote Public Health: A Radical Proposal’, (2015) 29(1) Bioethics 43. 
 
80  The Report (n 3), Ch 6, envisages a combination of healthcare and disciplinary regulation and agreement 
with NIPT providers and manufacturers. 
 
81   Deans et al (n 54). 
 
82   For discussion, see Wale (n 60). 
 
83  See, e.g., Rosamund Scott, ‘Prenatal Testing, Reproductive Autonomy, and Disability Interests’ (2005) 
14 Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 65. 
 
84  See, e.g., Day-Sclater et al (n 19). 
 
85  Robertson (n 33) at 3. 
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Is this a fair comment? Certainly, one of the striking features of the Report is the double ethical 
push-back against NIPT. First, in support of the making of autonomous choices, the Report 
recommends that information about the limits of NIPT and about the actualities of disability 
should be given; and, secondly, the Report recommends that women’s choices to use NIPT 
should be restricted except where the trisomies or other significant medical conditions are the 
target. This is a relatively conservative position and it will disappoint those who take a more 
liberal view. However, what is really missing from the Report is any compelling reason for 
taking such a position. Neither the ethical starting points nor the three guiding principles can 
do all the work in justifying this position. They can present the arguments, the tensions and the 
options; but they cannot of themselves determine how the balance of interests should be struck; 
they cannot tell us why, at the key points of opposition, one interest has more weight than 
another.  
It might also be said that, even if the Council gave compelling ethical arguments for its 
conservative position, in practice, the use of NIPT will not be so limited. That might or might 
not prove correct. However, we can scarcely lay this kind of responsibility at the door of the 
Council. For ethics councils, just as for regulators and lawmakers, there are no guarantees that 
the standards that are proposed and adopted are actually effective. 
Two General Questions: Informational Interests and Genetic Characteristics 
Whatever we make of the Council’s particular recommendations about the use of NIPT, we 
should not lose sight of the bigger picture. For, the Report implicates more general questions 
about the kind of society we want to be. Moreover, it does so at a moment of intense 
technological disruption86, when we find ourselves living in ‘information societies’ but without 
a settled sense of the ‘informational interests’87 that we should recognise. At the same time, we 
inhabit ‘genetic societies’—this, as the Chief Medical Officer has put it, is the era of 
‘Generation Genome’88—but without having a settled sense of how genetics fits with our 
traditional values. While some of our questions about genetics are informational questions, 
most vividly captured in our attempts to stabilise and ground the claimed rights to know and 
not to know89—or, as in the ABC case, establishing the circumstances in which A’s duty to 
                                                          
86  See Brownsword et al (n 30). 
 
87  Broadly speaking, we can treat our informational interests as relating to the integrity of the informational 
eco-system as well as to our individual ability to control the outward and inward flows of information 
that relate directly to ourselves. See, further, Roger Brownsword, ‘Infosoc 2018: Informational Rights, 
Informational Wrongs, and Regulatory Responsibilities’ Bournemouth University Working Papers in 
Law, No 1/2018. 
 
88  Annual Report of the Chief Medical Officer 2016: Generation Genome: available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/624628/CMO_annual_r
eport_generation_genome.pdf (last accessed July 15, 2017). 
 
89  See, e.g., R. Chadwick, M. Levitt, and D. Shickle (eds), The Right to Know and the Right Not to Know 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014); Roger Brownsword and Jeff Wale, ‘The Development 
of Non-Invasive Prenatal Testing: Some Legal and Ethical Questions’ (2016) 24 Jahrbuch für Recht und 
Ethik 31; Roger Brownsword, ‘New Genetic Tests, New Research Findings: Do Patients and Participants 
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respect the confidentiality of medical information obtained from B may legitimately be 
overridden in order to prevent harm to C90—others are of a quite different order, concerning 
who we are and what we might be. From a potentially long agenda for discussion, we can speak 
briefly to the question of informational interests and then to the bearing of genetic testing and 
selection on reproductive policies that aspire to treat all humans equally, fairly and inclusively. 
Our informational interests 
For some time, it has been clear that our twentieth-century understanding of our informational 
interests needs to be reassessed.91 That understanding, developed in the context of a certain 
state of technological development92, centres on our interest in treating some information as 
private (as no one’s business other than our own) and our having control over the circulation 
of such information (if and when it is disclosed). However, this interest in individual restriction 
and control now comes into tension with the general benefits that are to be obtained if only 
information might flow more freely. So, for example, in a recent contribution to the Chief 
Medical Officer’s Annual Report, we read: 
The success of genomic medicine will depend on patients having confidence that the 
way genomic information is generated, held and used will properly protect their 
interests. This requires re-examining the traditional rules around confidentiality, which 
focused on secrecy and the keeping of information as separate and private.93  
Moving into the present century, however, the main disruptions to privacy and confidentiality 
were presented, not by genomics, but by the IT infrastructures that support not only health care 
research but also vast swathes of commerce. While the requirement that the processing of 
personal data (in these new IT environments) should be fair and lawful, purpose-specific, and 
proportionate, might sound reasonable enough, there are huge problems in applying this 
standard in contexts that are as different as health care research and popular entertainment. 
With the recent developments in machine learning and AI, there are further pressures: it is one 
thing to turn a blind eye to the lack of proper notice and consent with regard to the collection 
and processing of data that enables recommender systems to profile consumers, quite another 
to do so when the Royal Free London NHS Foundation Trust agrees with Google DeepMind 
                                                          
Have a Right to Know—and Do They Have a Right Not to Know?’ (2016) 8 Law, Innovation and 
Technology 247; and Brownsword and Wale (n 16). 
90  (n 58). 
 
91  See, e.g., Roger Brownsword, ‘Informed Consent in the Information Society’ (2012) Health and Society 
Review 161, and ‘Guidelines for our Genomic Futures’ (2012) 20 MEDIC (Methodology and Education 
for Clinical Innovation—New Series) 179. 
 
92  For a fascinating account of the development of information and communication technologies, see James 
Gleick, The Information (London: Fourth Estate, 2011). 
 
93  Anneke Lucassen, Jonathan Montgomery, and Michael Parker, ‘Ethics and the Social Contract for 
Genomics in the NHS’ in Annual Report of the Chief Medical Officer 2016: Generation Genome (n 88) 
Ch 16, page 3. 
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to transfer more than a million patient records to the latter in order to facilitate the development 
of a clinical alert app for acute kidney injury.94  
Beyond rethinking which informational interests should be recognised, there is a need to rank 
the importance of particular interests relative to not only non-informational interests but also 
inter se. For example, if the ABC case95 does go to trial, the judge will have to determine 
whether the claimant’s interest in accessing information about her father’s medical condition 
prevails against the defendant’s responsibility to respect the confidentiality of the information 
at issue. The case for prioritising the claimant’s interest is not that the information will advance 
the collective interest in health care research. This is a case about reproductive autonomy and 
the traditional value of confidentiality. Whichever way we frame it, this is a tough call for any 
judge and, equally, a tough call for any community. 
Currently, we strive to specify our informational rights by asking whether it is a ‘reasonable 
expectation’ that the particular benefit or protection that we claim should be enjoyed, 
employing various reference points (in the positive law, in practice, in inter-personal signals, 
in accepted concepts and values, and so on) to determine whether or not an expectation is 
‘reasonable’.96 However, to recall one of our earlier remarks (in connection with the idea of 
harm to the wider society), an expectation might be reasonable because it relates to: (i) the 
preservation or protection of the preconditions for human existence or the essential context for 
any form of human social existence; or (ii) respect for the values that are fundamental to, and 
constitutive of, a particular form of human social existence;97 or (iii) a plausible balancing of 
the conflicting, but legitimate, interests and preferences of different members of the 
community. To deny an expectation that relates to (i) would be unreasonable and irrational; to 
deny an expectation that relates to (ii) would be unreasonable unless an equivalent competing 
expectation can be advanced; and to contest an expectation that relates to (iii) is to engage in 
the everyday negotiation of legitimate but conflicting interests. In other words, we need to 
differentiate explicitly and systematically between expectations that are reasonable relative to 
the essential pre-conditions for any human social existence and expectations that are reasonable 
                                                          
94  For criticism, see Julia Powles and Hal Hodson, ‘Google DeepMind and healthcare in an age of 
algorithms’ Health Technology (March 16, 2017) DOI 10.1007/s12553-017-0179-1. The Information 
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relative to positions and practices that already presuppose that these conditions are secured;98 
and we need to differentiate between expectations that draw on the values that make our 
particular community the distinctive community that it is and expectations that are argued for 
as reasonable in the routine processes of accommodating a plurality of interests.  
So, the first step is to consider whether there are any informational interests that are implicated 
in the essential preconditions for any kind of human social existence. Arguably, there are. In 
particular, if we accept that, as prospective agents, humans need an environment in which they 
are able to exercise these distinctive capacities, this implies a context in which humans are able, 
inter alia, to freely choose their own purposes, plans, and projects (‘to do their own thing’) and 
to form a sense of their own identity (‘to be their own person’). The potential implication of 
informational interests is nicely expressed in a recent paper from the Royal Society and British 
Academy where, in a discussion of data governance and privacy, we read that: 
Future concerns will likely relate to the freedom and capacity to create conditions in 
which we can flourish as individuals; governance will determine the social, political, 
legal and moral infrastructure that gives each person a sphere of protection through 
which they can explore who they are, with whom they want to relate and how they want 
to understand themselves, free from intrusion or limitation of choice.99 
In this light, we can understand not only why there is such a profound concern about intensive 
surveillance—whether George Orwell’s 1984100, the Chinese social credit system,101 or today’s 
dataveillance practices102—but also about the informational restriction of an agent’s open 
future. Quite simply, the concern is profound because it goes to the integrity of the critical 
infrastructure on which human social existence is itself predicated.103 
Having worked out which informational interests need to be recognised and protected as part 
of the infrastructure for any human community, the debate can move on to consider which, if 
any, informational interests are to be privileged in our particular community, Here, bioethics 
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becomes more local and potentially pluralistic; the values recognised as fundamental and 
constitutive by one community might differ from those of another (but, of course, all 
communities presuppose the same critical infrastructural conditions). Finally, we get to those 
legitimate interests and preferences that neither touch and concern the critical infrastructure for 
all human social communities nor the fundamental values of the particular community. Here, 
bioethics necessarily has to focus on facilitating acceptable compromise and accommodation 
rather than reminding communities of the preconditions and context for any purposeful activity 
or recalling the fundamental values to which the particular community has committed itself. 
None of this means that, in practice, communities will quickly agree on their scheme of 
informational interests but at least there will be some clarity about which questions should be 
asked and why one interest might be treated as more important than another.  
Our genetic characteristics 
How should the genomic generation square its new insights into human disease and, possibly, 
human behaviour with its approach, on the one hand, to human reproduction and, on the other, 
to disability, capability and enhancement?104 Two strands in the Report span and connect these 
matters. One is the importance attached to the future person having an open future and the other 
is the aspiration towards an equal, fair and inclusive society.105  
In the light of our preceding remarks, it will be understood that the preconditions for the self-
development of agents include leaving a person to make their own life choices. One aspect of 
this is leaving it to the person to decide how much or how little they themselves wish to know 
about their genetic pedigree or profile (quite apart from having a view about whether such 
information should be recorded and stored or available to others); and, another is leaving it to 
the person to develop their own talents and tastes. If the reproductive process involves 
gathering genetic information about the fetus-that-is-to-become-a-person—and it is arguable 
that we have special (heightened) responsibilities to such a fetus, responsibilities that are quite 
distinct from whatever rights women might have to terminate or to continue with a 
pregnancy—then there is a concern that the context for the latter’s self-development might be 
compromised. Similarly, if the reproductive process involves careful selection of genetic 
features that are associated with particular skills and talents, then there is a concern that the 
‘enhancement’ of the fetus will once again compromise the conditions for its subsequent self-
development. As Henry Greely has suggested, it might not be too many decades before 
reproduction takes place in highly controlled conditions.106 If so, society will need to decide a 
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cascade of questions about how it wishes to reproduce and what kind of human it wishes to 
reproduce.107 
Open futures, however, are not the Council’s only concern. Quite rightly, the Council argues 
that new reproductive technologies should be applied in ways that are consistent with the 
aspiration for equality, fairness and inclusiveness.108 At one level, that of the essential 
preconditions for human social existence, we are all in the same position. We all have an equal 
need for these conditions. However, at another level, once the preconditions are in place, we 
begin to contest our understanding of what is equal and fair and how far inclusivity should go. 
At this level, there will be a plurality of views and each community will have its own vision of 
an equal, fair and inclusive society. In some communities, it might be accepted that there is 
nothing unfair about permitting enhancement of an agent’s generic capacities; but, in others, 
where access to the relevant technologies is not equally enjoyed, such enhancement might be 
prohibited. However, even if the community’s aspirations for equality and fairness are satisfied, 
how does enhancement stand with its aspiration for inclusivity? 
One view is that it is not contradictory to treat enhancement as permissible or to adopt measures 
to reduce or even eliminate disabling genetic conditions while, at the same time, maintaining 
that those who are not enhanced or those born humans who are disabled should be fully 
respected.109 Whatever any particular community makes of this view, it already hints at perhaps 
the most disruptive effect of new technologies, namely to encourage a shift from ex post 
response (to crime, to illness, to accidents, and so on) to ex ante prevention. In the emergent 
technocratic mind-set the dominant thought is this: if we have the technology to manage a 
particular risk, why not use it? Over time, technological management might displace humans 
from the workplace, even laws as we know them,110 and in reproductive contexts it might 
deselect those embryos and fetuses that do not conform to the approved standard of quality and 
fitness, or that are viewed as unacceptable risks. It might seem like a very long way from NIPT 
to autonomous vehicles and to predictive policing, but the direction of travel towards 
prevention and preclusion is unmistakeable.111 
Neither the Council in its Report, nor we in this article, can resolve these important questions. 
These are matters that touch and concern not only the essential conditions for any viable human 
community but also the distinctive commitments of each particular society. Just as each human 
must determine what kind of person they aspire to be, it is for each community of humans to 
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debate and determine what kind of society they collectively aspire to be. This a challenge that 
should be neither underrated nor ignored―the debate about NIPT is, so to speak, merely the 
tip of an iceberg.  
The Role of the Council 
For a quarter of a century, the Nuffield Council on Bioethics has played a key role in informing 
the public about new developments in science and medicine (particularly new developments in 
human genetics), in highlighting the ethical and regulatory issues to which these developments 
give rise, and in encouraging rational debate and deliberation about a range of emerging 
biotechnologies. In a world where trust is at a premium, the Council rightly enjoys an enviable 
reputation for its independence and its integrity.  
Nevertheless, questions have been raised about whether the way that the Council traditionally 
operates is fully fit for purpose—witness, first, the Firetail evaluation of the Council112 and, 
secondly, the setting up of a new Governing Board, sitting between the Council and the 
Funders113, which is tasked with reviewing the Council’s ‘work, remit and delivery.’114 In this 
context, we can highlight two major challenges for the Council, one intellectual, the other 
political. 
The intellectual challenge centres on the Council’s general adherence to what Harald Schmidt 
and Jason Schwartz term a ‘flexible-focus’—as opposed to a ‘rigid-grid’—approach.115 In 
contrast with the latter, the ‘flexible-focus’ approach ‘does not impose ethical principles or 
norms in a top-down fashion, but identifies them anew for each topic or report.’116 Underlying 
this approach is the Council’s commitment to inclusiveness (no single view or approach to 
bioethics should be favoured, and the expression of all views should be encouraged), to 
rationality (all arguments should be capable of being heard but should be submitted to tests of 
coherence and rationality) and to rigour (the work of the Council should be based on the best 
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evidence available, and supported by careful and comprehensive analysis).117 The rationality 
and rigour, however, are engaged only after a range of voices has been inclusively heard.  
In the case of the Report on NIPT, the Working Group starts with a set of values which are 
then systematised by the three guiding Principles. Given its ‘flexible-focus’ approach, the 
Council is under no pressure to start from rights or utility rather than duty, or to major on the 
idea of solidarity,118 or vulnerability, or human dignity, or genetic identity (which is discussed 
in the mitochondrial DNA report)119 or stewardship (which features prominently in both the 
report on public health120 and the recent report on cosmetic procedures121), or to cross-refer to 
the ethics laid out in the contemporaneous report on gene editing.122 Taking its particular 
approach, the Council, as Schmidt and Schwartz put it, assumes ‘more the role of an editor or 
publisher, leaving the question of the extent to which deeper normative issues need to be 
addressed to the initiative of the working group.’123 
Put starkly, the question is whether the Council can take its commitment to rationality any 
deeper and whether, at the same time, it can develop a greater coherence and consistency across 
the body of its work. Without such depth, coherence, and consistency, sceptics might wonder 
why we should take the Council’s bioethical contributions seriously. Moreover, the Council is 
liable to find itself on the back foot in engaging with those scientists and technologists who 
think that their sphere of hard facts is where we find the terra firma of rationality. To be sure, 
the Council adds gravitas and some structure to bioethics, sharpening and organising the views 
of its consultees; but, so the criticism might go, it looks like one set of opinions is mediated by 
the working groups before being endorsed by the Council. 
Relating this to the balancing of competing interests which is central to the Report on NIPT, 
there is a problem, as we have said, about advocating a particular balance without offering a 
view about the ranking and weight of particular interests. If the Council could articulate a 
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defensible tiered scheme of interests, it would have reason to push hard for its views; but, 
without that kind of rational underpinning, arguably, it should stick to presenting the options. 
This leads to the other challenge which is more political in nature. At a time of major 
developments in the life sciences and their associated technologies, there are important 
conversations for each community to have. However, there is more than one way in which the 
Council might relate to these conversations. For example, the Council might follow its own 
advice in its report on emerging biotechnologies124 when, in the context of developing a public 
discourse ethics (oriented to the public good), it recommended that 
expert deliberation and public engagement exercises should report their conclusions not 
in the form of simple prescriptive findings but as a properly qualified ‘plural and 
conditional’ advice.125 
Taking this approach, the Council would see ‘the public’ as its principal audience; where 
recommendations are made, they would be presented as starting points for public debate—at 
most as a candidate common position in our pluralistic democracy; and, the impact of the 
Council’s reports would be measured, not so much by their translation into government policy, 
but by their contribution to the quality, reflectiveness, and rationality of public debate and 
deliberative democratic decision-making.  Alternatively, the Council might see itself as more 
of a player in policy circles than as a facilitator of public debate. Taking this approach, the 
Council would target key policymakers as its audience; its reports and recommendations would 
be sharpened to serve as scripts ready for immediate adoption by policymakers;126 and, the 
measure of its impact would be whether its views were reflected in government policy and 
practice. 
For our own part, we favour the former model. Unlike many other countries, the United 
Kingdom does not have a national bioethics council and, at a time of unprecedented 
technological disruption, the Council’s non-partisan facilitation of reflection on the public good 
would be more valuable than ever. However, the viability of this model is subject to a number 
of conditions: one is that this is actually the vision that the funders have for the Council; a 
second is that the new governance arrangements do not compromise the possibility of the 
Council acting as independent facilitators; and a third is that the Council resists the temptation 
to demonstrate ‘impact’ by closing down options that need to be kept open or by advocating 
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too hard for recommendations that are clearly contestable (whether because they are not 
evidence-based127 or because, normatively, they are not sufficiently robust).128 
In a world where emerging technologies are disruptive in both positive and negative ways129, 
the Council has made a significant contribution to public deliberation and to helping 
communities to focus on doing the right thing (emphasising that the fact that ‘we can do x’ 
does not entail that ‘we should do x’). If the process of renewal helps the Council to do this 
better, then that is all to the good; but, if the renewal signals a change of direction for the 
Council, then we should reserve judgment until we know precisely what role it is playing. 
Concluding remarks 
In this article, we have reviewed the Nuffield Council on Bioethics’ Report on NIPT, 
particularly the ethical framework that is developed to guide the Council’s recommendations 
on the legitimate use of NIPT; we have begun to sketch the bigger picture implicated by the 
Report, introducing two general questions arising therefrom, each of which speaks to the kind 
of community that we distinctively want to be; and we have offered some short reflections on 
the renewal of the Council itself and the role that it might play in society.  
Our view of the Report is that the ethical framework does not, and cannot without more, justify 
taking a particular position where the relevant considerations are in tension. The Council takes 
a relatively conservative view but it would face precisely the same problem if it had taken a 
more liberal view. So long as the question of the legitimate use of NIPT is framed in terms of 
finding a balance between various competing interests, there is no compelling reason for 
striking one balance rather than another. Without some sense of the relative importance of the 
various interests, there are just too many apparently ‘reasonable’ or ‘not unreasonable’ 
positions to be struck. In our remarks on the bigger picture, we have given some indication of 
how we might approach the importance of different human interests so that we can identify 
some positions as categorically unreasonable, others as inconsistent with a community’s 
fundamental values, and others as within the range of reasonableness. If, following its renewal, 
the Council could help the community to engage with new technologies against this kind of 
backcloth of human needs and interests, it would play an even more important role in 
stimulating and guiding public deliberation. Failing this, the Council should be slow to make 
hard recommendations but, instead, should focus on facilitating public engagement by making 
clear that there are a number of options to be considered and then choices to be made. 
As things stand, we find ourselves in a period of transition, of ‘inbetween-ness’, and of 
uncertainty―indeed, in a period of ‘liminality’ of just the kind that is being researched by 
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Graeme Laurie and his team at Edinburgh.130 First, it remains to be seen whether the 
conservative recommendations in the Report will be acted on and will actually hold the line. 
Secondly, there are already new research findings about the accuracy of NIPT131 and questions 
being raised about how best to offer the test.132 Thirdly, the ‘piloting’ of NIPT within the NHS 
Fetal Anomaly Screening Programme, leaves its status somewhere between ‘research’ and 
‘implementation.’ Fourthly, while public health providers make up their minds about NIPT, 
private provision of the test is subject only to the usual market rules. Fifthly, NIPT finds itself 
caught between a public health paradigm (with a mission for collective health and well-being) 
and a paradigm of reproductive autonomy and patient-centred health care (with a prospectus 
for individual rights).133 Sixthly, with some now making an ambitious call for ‘a broad 
renegotiation of the social contract for medical research and medical practice in the NHS’,134  
there is an opening for engagement with the more general questions that we have identified. 
Last but not least, the NCOB itself is in transition and there is a questionmark about its future 
role. On all fronts, we conclude that there are testing times ahead. 
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